Better V&V for Critical Flight Systems

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Critical aircraft systems are becoming more dependent on software. This brings with it the need to establish that the software will perform safely and reliably through all flight regimes, including emergencies. Verification and validation (V&V) is a key process for meeting that need for both military and civil procurements. For software developed with the UML (Unified Modeling Language), we are describing MOVAT, a computer-aided approach that is much more disciplined and repeatable than current practice and at the same time offers a considerable reduction in labor and schedule. MOVAT generates a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) directly from UML artifacts (use case diagrams during the requirements phase and class diagrams later on), and a Timed Petri Net (TPN) analysis of timing related problems from collaboration diagrams. These identify areas of greatest failure potential (expressed in severity categories) as well as associated detection capabilities and compensation (recovery) mechanisms. While software FMEA has been described and used previously it has generally been based on “functions”, a subjective concept. MOVAT uses operations of classes, clearly documented software constructs. When all operations in a class have been analyzed we can claim that the class has been completely evaluated, equivalent to using a parts list to establish that a hardware FMEA is complete. The FMEA and TPN permit V&V to concentrate on the software constructs most critical to safety of flight and to evaluate coverage of detection and recovery mechanisms. The emphasis is in most cases shifted from assessment of the functional software to assessment of the detection and recovery segments. These are usually much simpler and more standardized that the software elements that they protect and therefore the cost of V&V will be reduced. The procedure will be demonstrated on an autonomous active/standby redundancy management system, a design element encountered in fuel management, pressurization, and communication systems but also applicable on a grander scale to the leader/follower role assignment of a swarm of UAVs. The examples will describe applications during the requirements and coding phases. The research reported on here has been sponsored by the DARPA MoBIES project and AFRL.

Acronyms

AIAA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AFRL: Air Force Research Laboratory
CMM: Capability Maturity Model
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
MoBIES: Model-Based Integration of Embedded Software
MOVAT: Model-Based Verification and Assurance Tool
PHA: Preliminary Hazards Analysis
TPN: Timed Petri Net
V&V: Verification and Validation
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UML: Unified Modeling Language

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I. Introduction

Critical aircraft systems are becoming more and more dependent on software. In order to make sure the system will perform safely and reliably through all flight regimes, including emergencies, the software V&V has to effectively deal with the increased complexity and functionality. Although industry standards and government documents provide some guidance on the conduct of V&V, most observers will agree that there is considerable variability in V&V. The process frequently becomes open-ended and very costly.

The MOVAT approach described here automates many steps of V&V, rationalizes others, and provides a completion criterion. The automation is primarily aimed at programs that are generated from the UML models; other features are more broadly applicable.

MOVAT extracts classes and their operations from the UML class diagrams, puts these into hierarchical order, and prompts the analyst to assign to each operation one or more potential failure modes from a pull-down menu. Subsequent screens propagate the effects of these failure modes to the system level where a limited number of failure effects and standardized severity rankings are specified in consultation with the system engineers. For all failure modes, but particularly for those with the highest severity rankings, the analyst specifies means of failure detection and recovery. All of this data are saved into a database and then presented in FMEA worksheets.

Potential timing related failures are made explicit by means of a TPN presentation that can be constructed from the UML collaboration diagrams. Failure modes detected by the TPN are then incorporated into the FMEA.

The processes that accomplish this are shown in Figure 1. The left branch of the figure corresponds the generation of the FMEA, which will be described in Section III later, and the right branch corresponds to the generation of the TPN, which will be described in section IV.

The FMEA format provides a systematic way of presenting potential failure modes of a program and defenses against them (detection and recovery). When all operations of a UML-based program have been listed in the FMEA worksheet, the coverage is just as complete as when all parts have been listed in a hardware FMEA. This measure of completeness cannot be achieved by any other V&V approach in the public domain. The automated capture from the UML class diagrams and collaboration diagrams reduces both labor and the potential for errors and omissions.

The reviews are facilitated by the severity rankings of the FMEA. Instead of having to analyze the correctness of each element of the program, the reviewer can concentrate on the effectiveness of the protective measures, detection and compensation mechanisms. Because detection and compensation (recovery) procedures are much more standardized that functional program elements, the review process is speeded up and made more transparent. The capture of every operation used in the program assures completion of the process.

The principles of this approach can be applied to non-UML programs by structuring these in use case format. The use case format is also valuable for preliminary V&V activities in the UML based development before the program structure is complete.

In section II, we will first describe the V &V for pre-coding phase about software requirements, which often are documented in use case diagrams.

II. V&V for Pre-Coding Phase

The emphasis for V&V activities prior to coding is to prevent failures that could result in unsafe conditions or that could prevent completion of the mission. Early in the software requirements phase, any software component
INCREASING CRITICALITY

The measurement and estimation of software reliability were extensively studied by a group at Bell Laboratories and associated academic personnel. These researchers were primarily concerned with software running in the computer based switching systems, programs that underwent a lengthy period of testing during which faults were continuously removed as they were being found. As faults were being removed, the interval to detection of another fault increased, and this gave rise to fault depletion or reliability growth models such as the one shown in Figure 2.

A number of alternatives for the shape of the curve and for the measurements required to estimate the parameters are provided in the AIAA Recommended Practice from which the figure was adapted. Software for implementing several of these is available. However, some inherent limitations of this approach are evident from an examination of Figure 2. The first of these is that as the failure rate objective approaches zero the objective line becomes coincident with the asymptote of the curve. The location of the intercept that defines the end of the required test period is therefore very difficult to determine. It is obvious from the curve that a close approach to zero failure rate will necessitate a large extension of the test time and also uncertainty of the test time that will be required to achieve the objective. Keep in mind the hypothetical 10^-6 failures per hour attribute that was mentioned earlier. Further, knowledge of the “current failure rate” will always be subject to error. It can be based on the reciprocal of the interval between the last preceding failure and the last one, using a single sample and thus subject to large statistical uncertainty. Or it can be derived from an ensemble of failures that were observed over a given time interval, possibly accounting for the change in expectation by modeling the shape of the curve. While increasing the sample size, this makes the failure rate estimation subject to errors in the knowledge of the curve parameters.

A very significant difficulty arises from the inherent assumption in most of the models that the fault population is homogenous so that the time to encountering a fault is inversely proportional to (or nearly so) the number of remaining faults. There is considerable evidence that this assumption does not hold at very low failure rate levels, the ones that are of most interest for critical applications. Models have been proposed to account for the diversity in exposure time to find faults, but the test time required to validate the models and estimate parameters is very much greater than those for the homogenous models.

In summary, estimation of the failure probability that is required for numerical risk assessment requires large sample sizes (long test times). It works best when the failure rate objective can be set high which implies that the failure effects must be less than catastrophic or critical. As we have indicated, the quantitative risk approach had its origin in the communication industry where outages caused by software failures can cause significant loss of revenue but where there are no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Failure Mode</th>
<th>Pre-Failure Role</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Follower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Change Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active – Routine</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active – Partner Fails</td>
<td>Miss Change Tactics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Failure Modes and Effects for Receive HB Module

The early stage analysis performed here permits design changes to overcome undesirable failure modes with comparatively little project impact. An example of such a change is shown in Figure 3, an expanded representation of the Receive HB module. The design feature introduced to greatly reduce the probability of an active failure is to require receipt of three equally spaced pulses during a given interval to signify a valid heartbeat. Only when the counter reports exactly three heartbeats is a valid signal recognized. When zero heartbeats are received during an interval this constitutes a heartbeat failure. This condition is signaled to the Establish Loss of Partner module (see Figure 2) by absence of an alternating 0101 string. The alternating string is used to prevent a spurious high state on the line from being recognized as “ok”. An output of the counter other than zero or three is evidence of a failure in either the transmission link or the software and results in an error report being sent to mission control. This provides early warning of a previously undetectable condition that can impair mission success.
The corrective measures taken on the critical software elements identified at this early development stage must remain under review. In particular, subsequent V&V steps must assure that the coding fully implements the functions that have been adopted in preceding steps, and test must provide assurance that the protective measures work as intended.

### III. FMEA Generation from Class Diagrams

In a UML model of a software system, class diagrams represent the structure of the software and list all of the operations utilized by each class. Figure 4 shows the UML interface tool to retrieve classes and their methods, along with their association relationships. Information about collaboration diagrams or other timing related UML constructs can also be retrieved. They will be used to generate TPN as we will describe in section IV.

The listing of the operations of classes represents the entry point for FMEA generation, and because all operations are listed in the diagrams the software FMEA generated in this manner will be as complete as a hardware FMEA generated from a bill of materials. The FMEA permits systematic evaluation of the failure modes and their effects for all of the operations. The system level severity of the effects is characterized by standardized scales. For military use, there are four categories (I to IV) with I stands for highest severity. There are 10 severity ranks (1 to 10) for automotive applications with 10 stands for highest severity. The extent of the failure prevention activities (including V&V) should be governed by the severity classification. Thus the objective of the FMEA generation is to provide the organizing scaffolding for V&V activities, such as reviews and testing, during the late development phases.

The activities to perform software FMEA include the following:

- a. Collection of class and operation data from the UML tool
- b. Assignment of failure modes for each operation
- c. Propagation of failure modes to failure effects and classification of the severity of the effects
- d. Evaluation of protective measures (detection and compensation)
- e. Review of the FMEA for completeness and for adequacy of detection and compensation

A screen shot of the implementation of steps a. and b. is shown in Figure 5. The top two rows are provided by the UML listing; the left part contains the nomenclature and the right part the description of the selected component. The next row is devoted to failure mode assignment, with the left panel containing a large listing of potential failure modes from which MOVAT selects and lists in the right panel those applicable to the highlighted operation based on key words in the description. The right arrow key permits the analyst to add a mode from the general list to the selection while the left arrow key removes a failure mode from the selection.

The next lower panel and the associated tabs permit the analyst to select the operating phase for which effects and mitigation will be specified. For avionics applications typical phases are taxi, take-off, cruise, approach, and maintenance. The effect of a given failure mode will vary, depending on the phase in which it occurs. A failure in the radar altimeter program will have no significant effect in the taxi and maintenance phases, minor effects in take-off and cruise, and possibly catastrophic effects during approach.

The identification of failure effects and of mitigation (items c. and d. above) is shown in Figure 6. The top part of the screen is identical with Figure 5 but the lower part shows the response to the Effect and Mitigation tabs.

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**Figure 4. UML interface tool**
The effects of a given failure mode are typically evaluated at three levels: Local, Next Higher, and System, and this is the MOVAT default. For simple programs only a single effects level may be necessary while for an unusually complex one more than three levels may be required. The analyst can add or reduce effect levels from the MOVAT default. The system level effects are usually found in a system hazard analysis and are independent of the software analysis activities. For an avionics system typical system level effects are loss of aircraft, injury to passengers or crew, need for emergency landing, inability to reach destination, and unscheduled maintenance required. A severity category is associated with each system level effect, and again this decision is normally made by system engineering. Loss of a manned aircraft is a catastrophic effect (Severity I), injury and emergency landing are major events (Severity II), mission impairment is a marginal event (Severity III) and unscheduled maintenance is a minor event (Severity IV).

The protective measures, sometimes called mitigation, should correspond to the severity of the effect. In most cases protective measures consist of a detection mechanism and a recovery or compensation feature. Typical detection mechanisms are assertions, time-outs, and comparisons and these usually are implemented as operations in UML and they can be tagged as detection operations. This facilitates (a) semi-automated association with the operations that are being protected, and (b) protecting the operations against modification or deletion without careful review of the effects on the detection capabilities. Typical compensation features include re-try, re-start, use of default values and invocation of an alternate routine for accomplishing the impaired function. Again, the operations that implement these features can be tagged and thus the recognition of compensation for the covered failure effects can be automated.

IV. Timed Petri Net (TPN) Generation

System interaction problems are not necessarily apparent from the FMEA constructed in this manner. Hardware interaction problems are likewise not usually apparent from an FMEA but experience over many decades has shown that failure effects due to interaction problems are usually the same as those caused by parts problems. If the system tolerates a signal outage due to a parts failure it will also tolerate the outage if it is due to an interaction problem. However, software is particularly sensitive to timing variations. Therefore a separate investigation, based on TPN, is described in this section.

Because there is no assurance that the analyst will recognize timing related failure modes, the FMEA generation will be augmented by generating TPNs. Potential timing conflicts become obvious in a TPN and the expected frequency of these problems as well as the effectiveness of solutions can be explored analytically or by simulation. The existence of timing related failure modes and potential protective measures are then entered into the FMEA and are utilized in V&V in the same way as other failure modes.

The essential activities to perform TPN analysis are:

a. Selection of collaboration diagrams from the software UML model
b. Transformation from the UML construct into TPN model
c. Analytical analysis or simulation of the TPN model

An example of a collaboration diagram is shown in Figure 7, which represents the exchanges required to generate a lock. Passage of time is denoted by arrows and usually runs down and to the right. An arc above a function indicates data generated and consumed within the same function.

Figure 7. A sample collaboration diagram

Figure 8. High level TPN model
The information in the collaboration diagram is retrieved using the UML interface tool mentioned at the beginning of section III. Such information regarding the sequence in which classes and operations interchange messages are then used to create TPN models. As part of the transformation, UML classes and operations become TPN places, and UML arrows become TPN transitions.

For the collaboration diagram shown in Figure 7, a high-level TPN model is shown in Figure 8, which permits immediate recognition of a timing problem at transition TO5. Open rectangles are timed transitions, with the average delay (in computer cycles) indicated by numerals. Black rectangles are immediate transitions.

To get the external lock it is necessary that both inputs to TO5 be available within the same computer cycle. While the average delay is 10 computer cycles in either path leading to TO5, random events may delay one or the other signal and thus cause inability to complete the task. Given the distribution function for the delays, the probability of a timing problem can be calculated or it can be obtained by simulation (the TPN can be executed). Any remedial measures (such as holding the individual lock permissions for one or more computer cycles) or protective measures, such a repeating the operation if it does not complete, can be evaluated in this manner.

V. Conclusion

A major benefit is that the FMEA is based on a file of operations generated and maintained by the UML software tool that develops the software. Thus the analyst is relieved of the need to partition routines into “functions”. Since the operations are obtained from a complete file, it is possible to establish a completion criterion for the FMEA and also for the entire V&V. The generation of the FMEA is largely computer aided, with the analyst being prompted to select from context sensitive menus. Because the FMEA files reside with the program files, changes to the program will be immediately reflected in the FMEA file and the analyst will be prompted to accept automatically generated changes to the FMEA or to enter required changes. These features reduce the cost of FMEA generation, make it more objective and complete, and avoid the FMEA becoming “stale”.

Because timing problems are not obvious in the MOVAT FMEA generation described in section III, it is desirable to supplement that procedure by using timed Petri Nets. The graphics as well as the executable version of the TPN can be created in a largely automated manner from the collaboration diagrams that is part of the UML file. Thus MOVAT includes a very powerful tool for detecting and correcting timing problems.

The combination of FMEA and TPN based on the UML model will enable better V&V of computer programs for critical applications. Better here means:

- Computer-aided, if not fully automated.
- Organic part of the software development and therefore updated as it changes.
- More complete, with achievable completion criterion.
- More objective, yet allow “expert” review.

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